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European Integration, International Relations and the Problem (and Theory) of Complexity
By Robert Geyer

	Complexity has always been a problem for those trying to understand the dynamics of European integration. From the 1970s when Ernst Haas admitted that one should see the EU as composed “of infinitely tiered multiple loyalties” (Haas, 1971: 31), to the present where Philip Schmitter tried to describe it as a “post-national, unsoverign, polycentric, non-coterminus, neo-medieval arrangement” (Schmitter, 1996: 26), complexity has challenged the integration theorist. For international relations theorists, the debate between parsimony and complexity has been one of its deepest divisions during the post-WWII period (Hay 2002). 
	This problem and debate reflect a core theoretical division between a rationalist and reflectivist research paradigm within European integration, international relations and the social sciences in general. On the one hand, rationalists, tend to adopt an implicitly or explicitly “naturalist” framework (trying to emulate the traditional order and certainty of the natural sciences), while reflectivists adhere to a more “anti-naturalist” position (arguing that the unique aspects of human nature invalidate pure natural scientific approaches and methods). Constructivists have attempted to bridge this divide, but with only limited success.
The difficulty is that this division relies on a traditional and increasingly out of date view of the linear nature of the natural sciences. It assumes that nature and the natural sciences, particularly the physical sciences are inherently orderly, stable and predictable and the epitome of scientific research is the creation of universal scientific laws. However, since the middle of the 20th century a Kuhnian “paradigm shift” has been occurring within the natural sciences. The traditional linear view of science has been giving way to a growing non-linear or complexity framework and since the 1980s has been spilling over into the social sciences. This complexity framework does not eliminate or solve the problem of complexity. However, it provides a new and intriguing ontological and epistemological foundation for addressing the problem of complexity and helps to explain and overcome the separation between the two poles of debate in European integration and international relations.
	In order to explore the implications of complexity science on European integration (EI) and international relations (IR) theory this article will briefly review the core naturalist – anti-naturalist division within these theories and the attempt by constructivists to bridge this division. Next, it will briefly introduce complexity theory in the natural sciences and examine how it has been increasingly spilling over into the social sciences. Finally, it will argue that that the European Union (EU) and international system should be seen as complex systems and that if EU and IR theorists adopt a complexity framework they should be able to address the problem of complexity, bridge the divisions within EU and IR theory and make real academic progress.
International Relations: the growth of theoretical diversity and recognition of complexity and disorder
As is well known, IR theory in the early post-WWII period was dominated by the theory of realism. Realism assumed that nation-states were the primary units at the international level, they were rational utility-maximisers and the international level was an amoral anarchical arena where nation-states competed against one another for economic, political and military advantage. In essence, the system had a clear unchanging order (states in anarchy) which unsurprisingly reflected the experience of the Cold War. Given these assumptions, the international system could be understood from a positivist epistemological and methodological perspective. Nation-states were like balls in motion on a pool table and their behaviour and capabilities were assumed conformed to Newton’s laws of motion. They could be rationally calculated and predicted and would tend towards equilibrium (the “balance of power” concept).
By the 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods economic system, growth of transnational corporations and cooling of the Cold war, interdependence or regime theorists began to emerge (Keohane and Nye 1977, Krasner 1983). They stressed that the international system was not wholly anarchical, international actors had emerged and were increasingly important and the actions and interests of national actors could be reshaped by the “web of interdependence” or “regimes”. These theorists often tried to adhere to the positivist tradition. However, the “bounded rationality” of the main actors, the growing number and complexity of the key actors and the uncertain developments made a strict adherence to this tradition increasingly difficult. The international arena could no longer be understood as uniformly orderly and therefore analysed through purely reductionist and parsimonious strategies. 
In the 1980s and 1990s both realists and interdependence/regime theorists were criticised by reflectivist theories. These theories reflect a broad range of positions from critical theory and feminism, to post-modernism and post-strucutralism (Ashley 1986, Checkel 1998 and Walker 1993). Reflectivists emphasised that much of international relations (and realism in particular) were ideological constructs created by the dominant powers in the international system. Neither the actors nor the system were inherently rational and what was deemed to be rational in one time or context may vary in another time or context. Many reflectivists adopted anti-naturalist and anti-foundationalist positions, arguing that human experience was inherently distinctive from natural phenomena and that there could be no certain epistemological foundations for claims to fundamental human truths. Reality was what one made of it.
From the early 1990s, constructivists (Adler 1997; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999) attempted to “build a bridge between these two traditions” (Wendt 1992: 394) by emphasising ontological and epistemological openness. Not surprisingly, despite these bridge-building efforts both rationalists and reflectivists have continued to exclude and ignore each other while clinging to the certainty of their orderly or disorderly ontological/epistemological claims. For example, rationalists attempted to co-opt constructivism by arguing that, “rationalism… and constructivism now provide the major points of contestation for international relations scholarship” (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 646) and exclude reflectivism by stressing that: 
(it) denies… the use of evidence to adjudicate between truth claims… (it) falls clearly outside of the social science enterprise, and in IR research it risks becoming self-referential and disengaged from the world, protests to the contrary notwithstanding (Katzenstein et al.1998: 678).
On the other side, reflectivists have complained that social constructivism goes too far in a rationalist direction, accepting many of the major constructs such as the primacy of nation-states and drifting towards a positivist methodology (Smith 2001). Therefore, is the bridge-building strategy of constructivism doomed to failure? How can one accept different ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies?

European Integration Theory: the growth of theoretical diversity and recognition of complexity
EI theory mirrored much of the post-WWII development of IR theory (Chryssocyoou 2001, Rosamond 2000). In the 1950s and 60s, the core European integration debate involved intergovernmentalists, who saw the EU as an intergovernmental extension of a fundamentally realist international order, and functionalists/neo-functionalists, who saw the early EU as possessing the ability to functionally reshape the realist international order (at least within Western Europe). During these years debates raged over the degree to which early EU policy developments were determined by intergovernmental bargains or functional spillover. The fates of the theories were tied to the success or failure of the integration process. When it succeeded, neo-functionalists boasted. When it faltered, intergovernmentalists exulted. 
Following a period of stagnation in the 1970s, when many integration theorists drifted to other areas of research, integration theory revived in the 1980s and 1990s with the revival of integration through the Single European Market project. New theories, linked to the earlier ones, began to recognise the more complex and uncertain nature of European integration (Taylor 1983). Andrew Moravcsik carried the torch for intergovermentalists. However, even his concept of liberal intergovernmentalism recognised the importance of complex institutional dynamics (Moravcsik 1993). Others (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991) held on to a modified neo-functionalism. Both theories were brought together by multi-level governance theorists (Hooghe and Marks 2001) who argued that the EU was composed of, “overlapping competencies of among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels” (Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk 1996: 41).
Despite this increasing recognition of complexity, or because of it, reflectivist and constructivist works came late to EI theory, only beginning to emerge in the late 1990s (Christiansen et al. 2001; Checkel 1998 and 1999; Diez 1999; Jørgensen 1997). Again, similar to the experience in IR theory, constructivists saw themselves as “establishing a middle ground” (Christiansen et al. 2001: 8) between rationalist and reflectivist paradigms. Unsurprisingly, they came under fire from both sides of the debate. On the one hand, reflectivists complained that it was:
Far more ‘rationalist’ in character than ‘reflectivist’; indeed I would go so far as to say that social constructivism in its dominant (mainly North American) form is very close to the neo-liberalist wing of the rationalist paradigm (Smith 2001a: 191).
On the other hand, rationalists argued that: 
All this (philosophical speculation) distracts constructivists from the only element truly essential to social science: the vulnerability of conjectures to some sore of empirical disconfirmation (Moravcsik 2001: 186).
Moreover, Mark Pollack, echoing the conclusions of Katzenstein et al. (1998) in IR theory, argued that EI theory must accept “broader ontologies”, but:
we must necessarily fall back on careful empirical testing… as the ultimate, and indeed the only, standard of what constitutes ‘good work’ and what constitutes support for one approach or another (Pollack 2001: 236).
Just like IR, EI theory was divided into two opposing poles and a struggling bridging strategy.

Where do we go from here?
	What does this brief review of IR and EI theory demonstrate? First, there has been a significant challenge to the hegemonic position of the rationalist paradigm in IR and EI theory since the 1970s. Second, linked to this challenge has been the growing recognition of human and social complexity. Third, a core division has emerged within the discipline between rationalist who adopt a strong naturalist position, modelling themselves on the natural sciences, and reflectivists who adopt an anti-naturalist position and oppose the use of natural science epistemologies and methods in the human sphere. Fourth, constructivists have attempted to bridge this division by emphasising the importance of broader ontologies, but have been rejected and/or co-opted by both sides. 
	The obvious question is: where do we go from here? Are we left with two poles bickering at each other from distinctive theoretical domains and a tenuous bridging strategy? 
	I would like to suggest a strategy for moving beyond this static position. The reason why rationalist and reflectivists are unable to engage with each other is that their ontological frameworks are so diametrically opposed.  Constructivism can try to recognise both frameworks, but it cannot reconcile them. However, a new complexity theory framework can! Complexity theory argues that order, complexity and disorder all play a role in the creation of the natural and human world. For complexity theory, there are orderly, complex and disorderly phenomena and different epistemological and methodological strategies apply to each. Universal laws and order only apply to certain phenomena. What complexity theory implies is that the fundamental naturalist – anti-naturalist division within the IR and EI theory is based on an out of date view of the natural sciences. The natural sciences have not stood still. They have gone through a Kuhnian paradigmatic revolution which challenges the traditional naturalist – anti-naturalist division. Without this division, neither rationalists nor reflectivists can claim to have a superior grasp of reality or a greater access to the “truth” since both are only describing part of the picture.

Complexity Theory: From a linear to non-linear paradigm in the natural sciences​[1]​
Until recent decades, discoveries in the natural sciences were formulated within a linear paradigm that emerged during the Enlightenment. Descartes and Newton were the principal architects of the new paradigm. The former advocated intellectual rationalism while the latter presented a whole raft of fundamental physical laws. Given this belief in human rationality and fundamental physical order, there seemed to be no limit to the ability of human beings to comprehend and hence control the natural world. Using reductionist methods that envisioned the whole as the simple methods sum of the parts, all physical phenomena were assumed to based on a few core laws, change in a smooth and predictable manner and demonstrate high levels of order and predictability. The subsequent phenomenal success of the industrial revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries, which was based on this new scientific approach, created a high degree of confidence in the power of human reason to tackle any physical situation. By the end of the 19th and the early years of the 20th century many scientists believed that few surprises remained to be discovered.
However, during the 20th century the natural sciences began to experience a Kuhnian 'paradigm shift'​[2]​ that propelled them beyond the confines of the Newtonian linear paradigm. Not surprisingly, the process was both lengthy and convoluted. Doubts about the current paradigm appeared soon after World War I, although there were earlier indications that a shift was due. Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity, Neils Bohr’s contributions to quantum mechanics, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and the work of many others probed and then expanded the limits set by Newton and Descartes. 
 	It is important to point out that the above pioneers and others who followed them did not disprove Newton. Essentially, they demonstrated that some phenomena in physics, and other fields, are predominately orderly, others disorderly, and others probabilistic. In other words, there is not just one type of physical order, but a whole range of types. The shift within the natural sciences from utter certainty to questions of probability was well established by the early 1930s. But there was a time lag between its adoption by the exclusive niches occupied by particle physicists, cosmologists and mathematicians and its later propagation amongst the rest of the natural sciences. Due to narrow fields of specialisation and other factors, shortcomings of the old paradigm and the emergence of the new paradigm were missed or ignored by many of those working in the natural sciences. Basically, linearity and its reductionist methods continued to be seen by many scientists as the proper and only means for rendering difficult situations more amenable to analysis. For many specific purposes they were quite appropriate.
	The process of transformation gathered momentum in the second half of the 20th century. As before, mathematicians and physicists were in the lead, but now meteorologists, chemists, geneticists, and economists joined the fray. Researchers became increasingly interested in a family of systems each involving numerous components that interact with each other to influence the whole system in a manner that could not be discerned by observing the activities of the internal elements themselves. Such entities are referred to variously as nonlinear, complex, dynamical or dissipative systems, to highlight particular aspects of their behaviour (Nicolis and Prigogine 1989 and Kauffman 1995). Key elements of complex systems are their “incompressibility” and the “law of excess diversity”. Complex systems are incompressible because any description claiming completeness must be as complex as the system itself. Moreover, complex systems constantly have the potential for moving to different patterns. Hence, they always have excess diversity relative to their current stable pattern. In organic complex systems, having excess diversity is often essential for the long-term survival of the organism or species (Allen 1988). Other characteristics of complex systems are summarised in the following.

FIGURE ONE
Characteristics of a complex system (summarised from Cilliers 1998: 4)
	Complex systems consist of a large number of elements.
	A large number of elements are necessary, but not sufficient.
	The interaction is fairly rich, i.e. any element in the system influences, and is influenced by, quite a few other ones.
	The interactions are non-linear.
	The interactions usually have a fairly short range, i.e. information is received primarily from immediate neighbours
	There are loops in the interaction
	Complex systems are usually open to their environment.
	Complex systems operate under conditions far from equilibrium.
	Complex systems have a history.
	Each element in the system is ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole.

In the natural world, the simplest type of complex systems involves elements with no ability to make choices, learn and/or adapt to their environment: mechanical complexity. The complex system of water molecules creating a vortex in your bathtub is a common example. The molecules self-organise and form a stable complex system so long as the water lasts in the bathtub. The vortex is easy to recreate, but the exact combination of water molecules that made the specific vortex would be virtually impossible to recreate. Each vortex, though similar, is not an exact copy of the other. Weather patterns are another common example. They can evolve remarkably stable patterns, but tracing all of the factors which produced a given pattern would be impossible. Moreover, a similar pattern at a later time could be composed of very different elements and interactions between those elements. 
The next level of complexity would involve elements which are capable of responding to their environment: organic complexity. Biological examples such as the evolution of a species or the interaction of a given plant or animal in a particular ecosystem are the most obvious. For example, fish in a small pond evolve and interact with the various food sources (small plants and animals) in the pond to create a stable complex system (such as a stable total number of fish). However, if a change is introduced to the system, a new competitor or food source, the fish may adapt and alter the nature of the system. 
	Outside of this zone of complexity are predominately linear and alinear phenomena. The classic example of a linear system is the effect of gravity in a vacuum, while alinear examples include quantum physics and relatively theory. The obvious problem with specifying alinear phenomena is that they have no pattern and hence cannot be predicted or described other than theoretically. These examples can be arranged in the following table. 





















From a Linear to Non-linear Paradigm in the Social Sciences
The success of the linear paradigm in the natural sciences had a profound effect on attitudes and practices in all sectors of human activity, spreading well beyond the disciplines embraced by the original scientific discoveries. The social sciences were no exception. Surrounded by the technological marvels of the industrial revolution which were founded on a Newtonian vision of an orderly, clockwork universe driven by observable and immutable laws, it did not take much of an intellectual leap to apply the lessons of the physical sciences to the social realm. Adam Smith and David Ricardo claimed to have captured the laws of economic interaction. Karl Marx wedded his vision of class struggle to an analysis of the capitalist mode of production to create the “immutable” and deterministic laws of capitalist development. Academics in all the major fields of social science welcomed the new age of certainty and predictability with open arms. Economics, politics, sociology all became “sciences”, desperate to duplicate the success of the natural sciences. Moreover, this desire was institutionalised through the development of modern universities which created and reinforced the disciplinarisation and professionalisation of the social sciences (Gulbenkian Commission 1996: 7).
The high point of the linear paradigm was reached in the 1950s and 60s, particularly in universities in the United States. Strengthened by the success of planning programmes during WWII and the early post-war period, pressured by the growing Cold War, and lavishly funded by the expanding universities, American academics strived to demonstrate, and hence control, the presumedly rational nature of human interaction. This traditional Newtonian approach was clearly expressed in the modernisation theories of the Third World development, the realist vision of international relations, the behaviouralist writings of sociologists, the positivist foundations of liberal economics and the rational plans of public policy experts and urban planners.
 	Using the Newtonian frame of reference modern social scientists unjustifiably assumed that physical and social phenomena were primarily linear and therefore predictable. They, consequently, applied reductionist methods founded on the belief that stable relationships exist between causes and effects, such as the assumption that individual self-interest is an explanation and/or a model for national level self-interest. Furthermore, based on this linear thinking they assumed that society and social institutions had an “end-state” towards which they were evolving. Hence, economic interaction, democracy, fundamental social orders (communism, capitalism, development), etc. all had final stages towards which they were evolving. Nation-states, societies and even individuals could be positioned along this developmental pathway and policies could be devised to help them towards the next level. 
The remarkable dominance of the Newtonian frame of reference is brilliantly captured by a quotation from an early critic of the “scientific” approach in politics argued in 1962: 
So deep and widespread is the belief, so eminent and able the believers in the value of the contemporary scientific study of politics, that there is not a little impatience with any attempt to question it… All of us who profess the study of politics are confronted with the prevailing scientific approach, no matter how practical our concern, how slight out interest in methodology, or how keen our desire to get on with the business of direct investigation (Strong 1962: v).
The notable international success of Francis Fukuyama’s book (Fukuyama 1993)​[3]​, which claimed that history had reached its endpoint, demonstrated the continued influence of the linear framework.
However, even at its peak countervailing tendencies in the social sciences survived. There is nothing new about questioning the fundamental order and rationality of human existence. A belief in the fundamentally rational and orderly nature of human existence only emerged in the Western philosophical tradition in the 17th and 18th centuries. Before this period, much of the human and physical world embraced unknowable mysteries that were cloaked in the enigmas of religion. During the 19th and 20th centuries, there continued to be a huge variety of potent critics of human rationality from the hermeneutical tradition of Freud and Weber, the post-empiricism of Habermas, the pragmatism of Dewey, the French post-modernists and deconstructivists, etc. Consequently, from the 1970s onwards as social scientists continually failed to capture the ‘laws’​[4]​ of society and economic interaction and were continually frustrated over their inability to do so, they began to significantly question the Newtonian framework. Some reasserted the inherent irrationality of human existence, particularly post-modernist and constructivist thinkers. Others, particularly in economics, held tightly to the Newtonian framework. However, many others drifted towards a middling position between the extremes of a strictly scientific Newtonian framework and the fundamentally irrationalist reflectivist one.​[5]​ It is this movement that has led the social sciences to the threshold of a 'scientific revolution' that could shift them into a complexity paradigm. 
Complexity theory does not disprove the rationalist paradigm or its antithesis (reflectivism), but acts like a synthesis or bridge between the naturalism of rationalism and the anti-naturalism of reflectivism and creates a new framework which bridges the two opposing positions. Both orderly rationalism and disorderly reflectivism are equally flawed. Both assume that humanity is inherently orderly or disorderly when in reality it is both. Given a complexity framework, one can produce a range of orderly to chaotic social phenomena that parallels the physical phenomena in Figure One.
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Beginning with linearity, the most fundamental and universalistic elements of human complexity are basic physiological functioning, in particular life and death. Moving into the range of complex systems, examples of mechanistic complexity in human systems would involve situations where individuals were forced to act in a mechanistic fashion. Traffic dynamics, choosing one road or another, crowd dynamics, choosing one exit or another and electoral outcomes, choosing one candidate or another are all examples of mechanical complex systems. Like mechanical complex system, relatively simple and stable patterns will emerge. However, this is no guarantee that these patterns will be continuously stable (traffic jams, crowd delays, landslide elections) nor is it possible to perfectly recreate the exact conditions of these events at a later time.
Examples of organic complex systems in the human world can easily been seen in the organisational dynamics of economic and social institutions. As demonstrated by the huge growth in management and complexity literature (see footnote 6), a business is a complex system which interacts with a larger complex environment (the market) that is very similar to the earlier model of a fish in a pond. General patterns emerge and the business is able to adapt to changes in its environment, but exact predictions and explanations of how a change in the environment will affect the business or the best strategies for the business to survive in the altered environment are impossible to know in advance.
An added layer of complexity in the human condition is its faculty of consciousness. Human beings create signs, symbols, myths, narratives and discourse in order to understand, control and exchange information about their surroundings. This ability adds another layer of complexity onto the human condition that is distinctive from the natural world. Examples of this conscious complexity include the creation of language, norms and values, discourse and myth-making. An example can be taken from virtually any type of human verbal interaction. A seemingly simple student-teacher relationship can be layered in historically, culturally and personally specific aspects that would be impossible to recreate in a different time and place. 
Lastly, like the natural world, alinear human phenomena are nearly impossible to explain using examples since they are without a pattern and would have to be completely random. The closest common human experiences that readily come to mind would be the chaotic nature of dreams and the unconscious and random effects of certain disorders on the complex functioning of the brain.
As it has filtered into the social sciences​[6]​ complexity theory argues that physical and social reality is composed of a wide range of interacting orderly, complex and disorderly phenomena. One can focus on different aspects, orderly (gravity or basic aspects of existence: life/death), complex (species evolution or institutional development) or disorderly (random chance or irrationality) but that does not mean that the others do not exist. Consequently, complexity theory demands a broad and open-minded approach to epistemological positions and methodological strategies without universalising particular positions or strategies. As Richardson and Cilliers argued: 
If we allow different methods, we should allow them without granting a higher status to some of them. Thus, we need both mathematical equations and narrative descriptions. Perhaps one is more appropriate than the other under certain circumstances, but one should not be seen as more scientific than the other. (Richardson and Cilliers 2001: 12).

These conclusions mirror those of ‘critical realists’ such as Bhaskar (1986) and the  ‘reflexive realism’ of Beck (1992) and, “bridge the old divide between the two worlds (of natural and human sciences) without privileging the one above the other” (Richardsen and Cillers, 2001: 11). 

Can the European Union and International System be Interpreted as Complex Systems?
As defined by Cillers in Figure One, complex systems display several main characteristics. These can easily be applied to the European Union and the international system. They both:
	Have a large number of elements.
	Have interactions that are rich, non-linear, largely local and looped.
	Are open to their environment.
	Rely primarily on local information.
	Operate under conditions far from  equilibrium.
	Have a history.
	Are composed of elements that are ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole.

Similarly, one can argue that the European Union and international system are composed of orderly, complex and disorderly phenomena.
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	The most linear aspect of the EU is its core short-term framework. There is a very high degree of probability (near linearity) that the basic structures of the EU (core memberstate voting balances, institutional structures, power relationships) will remain stable in the short term. The various voting procedures in the EU Parliament and Council demonstrate aspects of mechanical complexity of the EU. Choices are constrained by having to vote for or against a particular proposal and may produce stable patterns (certain member states or groups always voting for/against certain proposals). However, the pattern is not continuously stable, nor can one be certain that similar voting patterns at different times were based on the exact same factors. For example, the Scandinavian countries may generally vote as a block on most proposals, demonstrating a stable pattern, but their exact reasons for doing so may vary substantial with every proposal.
	As any multi-level governance theorist would point out, organic complexity is most obvious in the multiple types of memberstate and EU institutional interaction. Member states and EU institutions are constantly interacting in evolving and adaptive ways to new policies and developments within the EU system. Stable patterns emerge, but these are much more succeptable to unpredictable developments as different member states and institutions constantly evolve and adjust to new opportunities and constraints.  For example, many observers of EU social policy expected it to expand rapidly after the defeat of the British Conservative government in 1997 (Geyer 2000). However, despite a more receptive pro-social policy Labour government other supposedly pro-EU social policy member states suddenly became less supportive. The basic pattern of limited EU social policy developments continued, but the internal dynamics were transformed.
	Conscious complexity is most obvious in areas such as the meaning of EU citizenship and the implementation of EU policies in the member states. EU citizenship is an extremely contested concept and means drastically different things to the various member states and groups within the member states. This is complicated by the continual evolution of the norms surrounding “citizenship” within the member states themselves and how the actions of the EU, its policies, are implemented and interpreted by the member states and their populations.
A good example of the alinear nature of the EU would be assumptions of its long term. There are so many possible outcomes of the mechanical, organic and conscious complex systems with and surrounding the EU that predicting its exact development in the long term is obviously an alinear exercise. One can guess or pick a future that one would like to see, but it will have virtually no direct relationship to the one which will emerge.
The international system can also be analysed in a similar fashion.
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The basic framework of the system, particularly its significant power inequalities, appears as its most obvious linear aspects. Nation-states have been significant actors, have experienced power inequalities and struggled to adapt and change them are all parts of what appears to be a basic framework of the international system. The power of the USA significantly influences its range of options for responding to events such as those of 11 September. However, mechanical complexity can be immediately perceived within the procedures of the international institutions and regimes (UN, regional and trade organisations, etc.) which pervade the international system. The choice of supporting the USA in its “war on terrorism” led to a recognisable pattern of responses from various countries. However, the exact reasons behind these decisions or that an exact group would support a later “war on terrorism” would be extremely hard to predict. 
Organic complexity can easily be identified in the adaptive and interactive strategies that emerge when international institutions, states and non-state actors interact with each other. For example, as the USA began talking about expanding the “war on terrorism” to include other nations (North Korea, Libya, etc.) they upset the balance in the coalition which was supporting the actions in Afghanistan. Allies began to weaken their support and question other areas, Palestinian conflict in Israel, of US international policy. This was obviously complicated by the conscious complexity of competing norms and interpretations of the “war” and US policies. A good example would be the different interpretations of the treatment and rights of the prisoners at Camp X-Ray at Guantonamo Bay. Finally, the exact long-term development of the international system would seem to be the most uncertain and unpredictable analysis. How could an observer of the international system of 1900 have predicted the rise of communism, two world wars and the hegemony of the USA by 1950? How could an observer in 1950 have predicted the economic success of the West, collapse of communism and rise of the European Union by 2000? The range of possible developments and interactions is enormously large.

Implications for European Integration and International Relations Theory
	If the EU and international system can be interpreted as complex systems, then there are several major implications for EI and IR theory. First, this implies “incompressibility”, that any truly accurate description must be as complex as the system itself. Hence, the pursuit of parsimonious order must of necessity take the observer further and further from holistic reality. Second, since the EU and international systems are composed of different phenomena then one must accept methodological pluralism; quantitative modelling, qualitative analysis, historical description and narrative discourse all have their place with regard to particular phenomena. There is no universal hierarchy of phenomena and hence no hierarchy of method. Third, this uncertainty or perceived lack of knowledge is actually a strength of human systems since:

it is this very “ignorance” or multiple misunderstandings that generates microdiversity, and leads therefore to exploration and (imperfect) learning (Allen 2001: 41).

This means that different interpretations, diverse interests, uncertain responses, clumsy adaptations, learning and mistakes are what keep a system healthy and evolving. Truly orderly systems, where all of the elements are at the average, are dead systems and have no ability to explore new patterns or adapt to new environments. 
The EU itself provides an excellent example of the healthy nature of complexity. From an orderly rationalist framework it is incomprehensively messy. From a reflectivist standpoint it cannot possibly order the multi-faceted and multi-level nature of its constituent societies and sub-groups. Nevertheless, it exists and thrives as an excellent set of institutions for promoting complex interaction, learning, diversity and adaptation at the sub-national, national and European levels. Just imagine how long the EU would last if it did try to assert a comprehensive rigid order on the multitude of memberstates. Even its most rigid policies, such as EMU, allow for a surprising amount of hidden flexibility and adaptation. In fact, it is the very flexibility of the other aspects of economic policy that allows the memberstates to accept the rigidity within the European monetary order. As Hodson and Maher explain in relation to the EU’s “open method of coordination” (developed for the 2000 Lisbon European Council) for promoting economic policy cooperation:
This is no formal attempt to control outcomes (outside of fiscal policy of course), and process is determined by a system of benchmarking and lesson-drawing, emphasizing state competence and the voluntary alignment of policies… The desire of the EC to control outcomes, as manifest in the directive as the rule of choice in the single  market, with its emphasis on common outcomes if not methods, is overcome by recognition of the importance of diversity at the national level in relation to policy formation, legal frameworks, ideational references and popular perceptions and reactions to either the European project generally or the specific policy being co-ordinated (Hodson and Maher, 2001:731).

In essence, the EU works because it combines an agreed fundamental framework with memberstate diversity and autonomy. This was not based on any preordained plan, but emerged from a multi-faceted combination of historical events and political economic structures including the weakness of the EU as a power centre, the continuing resilience of the memberstates to oppose centralising EU initiatives and the evolving nature of the international system. A significant change in any of these factors could easily have disrupted the seemingly rational complex development of the EU.
Can Complexity Help International Relations and European Integration Theory to Progress?
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Crowd  dynamics.  Electoral outcomes. Economic laws.  supply and demand laws 

Group dynamics. Institutional processes.








European citizenship. Policy implementation

Memberstate interaction. EU Institutional interaction.







Basic framework and power relationships

Nationalism. Internationalism (human rights)

State and non-state actor interaction.  Institutional interaction.

Voting outcomes in the various international institutions. 





^1	  A similar review of complexity can be found in Geyer 2002. Major works on complexity include: Bar-Yam (1997), Capra (1991), Coveney and Highfield (1995), Gell-Mann (1994), Gleick (1988), Kauffman (1993 and 1995) and Waldrop (1992).
^2	  In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), Thomas Kuhn argued that "normal" or "mature" science progresses through major shifts, scientific "revolutions", from one paradigm to the next. A paradigm embraces the rules and assumptions and associated problems that require resolution at a particular stage of a science's history. In effect the paradigm defines the envelope within which workers in that field conduct their affairs. When problems are encountered that the paradigm fails to resolve over a long period one or more individuals advance a new paradigm to replace the old regime. A new paradigm is only accepted after considerable, and on the whole healthy, scepticism and resistance, and providing it fulfils its promises. Henceforth, scientists work within the confines of the new paradigm until the next revolution arrives. Examples of "paradigm shifts" include the move from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy and from Aristotelian to Newtonian dynamics.
^3	  Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis continues to resonate with elite and mass opinion particularly after the events of September 11. See Fukuyama’s article “How the West Has Won” The Guardian 11 October 2001.
^4	  For a review of the role of laws in the social sciences see: Martin and McIntyre (1996).
^5	  For discussions of the development of the debate between these two sides see: Bevir (1999), Bhaskar (1986), Byrne (1998) and Cilliers (1998), Delanty (1997) and Rasch and Wolfe (2000).
^6	  Non-linear systems theory (complexity theory) has established footholds in all of the major areas of social science. In philosophy and social theory see: Byrne (1998) and Cilliers (1998). In economics see: Barnett et al. (1989), Day and Samuelson (1994), Hodgson (1997), Mirowski (1994), Ormerod (1994 and 1998). In organisational and management theory see Stacey (1999) and Stacey et al. (2000). In sociology and politics see: Cioffi-Revilla (1998), Eve et al. (1997), Kiel and Elliott  (1997), Rycroft and Kash (1999). In development theory see: Rihani and Geyer (2001) and Rihani (2002). In political theory see: Geyer (2002) and Scott (1998). In international relations see: Jervis, R. (1998). For an excellent overview of the spread of complexity theory and a critical review of its popularisers see: Thrift (1999).
